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I would like to say at the outset that I am partial to Simon Keller’s Partiality, butthis would necessitate an explanation of my reasons that would threaten to be-
come as complex as the book itself.
So, instead, I will have to adopt the impartialist stance that a good reviewer
should take on the subject of a book review.
To be clear, there is no special relationship between Keller and myself, no
knowledge of each other’s existence—just my encounter with the book he has
written.
The book is his attempt to consider the ethics of partiality in its own right, not
as a problem with impartialist moral theories. In other words, while impartialist
moral theories (“our most influential theories of morality”) regard the ethics of
partiality as a problem—a deficiency—Keller argues that “at least at face value”
it appears to be “a distinctive and significant part of our ethical lives” (vii).
Impartialist theories, therefore, are thought to provide the underpinning, the
ethical foundation of the special relationships that lead us to be partial to some
people more than others. But “as many philosophers have noticed,” it seems un-
likely that impartialist theories “can do justice to the ethics of partiality” (vii).
Keller is ambitious in his aims, by implication—if he can demonstrate that
there is something that can be independently identified as “the ethics of par-
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tiality,” in whatever circumstance, then he has undermined the foundations of
impartialist ethics as a whole.
He might also legitimate “the ethics of partiality” as a field for further explo-
ration in its own right, not merely as a subset of impartialist moral theory.
Keller divides the approaches to the ethics of partiality into three groups: the pro-
jects view, the relationships view, and the individuals view (viii). From the outset,
he identifies his preference for the individuals view of partiality, noting that to pro-
vide support for the idea that ethics “is ultimately about the good of individuals” is
one of his goals. By doing this, it is not necessary to assume that “other types of en-
tities, like relationships,” have any basic ethical significance (ix).
To hit the high points of the argument, Keller considers whether projects,
relationships or individuals best illustrate how special treatment might be extrap-
olated from one circumstance into a more general characteristic of how we make
decisions.
The option for the ethics of partiality is that we treat people differently be-
cause this will lead to a better or more desirable outcome in whatever activity
or project we are involved. As partners working toward a particular goal, conse-
quentialist logic applies, in that we will have a better outcome if we act this way
instead of another.
Similarly, looking at partiality in terms of relationships, we treat people dif-
ferently because we are in a relationship with them—a kind of Kantian obligation
or duty we therefore have, such as to our children or to some family member. So
we act in certain ways because we are a parent and this is our child, we are a son
or daughter and these are our parents, and so on.
When it comes to individuals, however, Keller notes that special status results
from the inherent value we find in the person. Partiality emerges from the recog-
nition and appreciation of that value, not what they can do for us or because of
the externalities of some relationship.
The book is clearly and evenly written, using recurrent examples (like at-
titudes to one’s child) to illuminate different aspects of the problem and thus
making it accessible to the general reader. While the logic at times might seem
circuitous, he carefully signposts each step along the way and even though the
road twists and turns, he leaves an appropriate trail of bread crumbs for readers
to follow if they happen to miss the signs.
I do not wish to replicate his argument by virtue of an attempt at synopsis,
however. Instead, I want to go straight for the core of it and challenge the concep-
tualization of his approach as a whole. While the reader is led along very carefully
throughout the book, the trail of crumbs effectively stops at a clearing in the mid-
dle of the forest, with no obvious path forward. Keller offers a small smorgasbord
of possibilities at the end of the book, but this outcome does not bear the weight
of the expectations he has created from the start.
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All of these expectations issue in the conclusion that we treat some people
special because, to us, they are. In effect, having set out to provide a rational, me-
thodical demonstration, Keller ends up with what is in effect an intuitive response
to his initial question (even though he claims it is not).
Once people become special for whatever reason and in whatever circum-
stance, their specialness legitimates different treatment than we would offer, for
reasons, to people who are not.
The emphasis on inherent value or values that inhere in the individual, the re-
lationship or the project, is then offered as the reasons for partiality.
But it is not a reason. It is fundamentally indemonstrable—intuitional and not
rational. The effort to uncover reasons for partiality in effect demonstrates that
there are none able to be extrapolated from individual situations. We are partial
to some people because we are.
Why do we perceive the inherent value in one individual more than others?
Does that value we perceive need to be reciprocated in some respect, or is stalking
one variant of the ethics of partiality, where value is appreciated by one party and
not the other?
I said at the outset I was partial to Keller’s book, not because in the end I feel
he has made a convincing case for the ethics of partiality residing in the individ-
uals view, as he puts it, but because I want him to be right.
I have long thought that impartiality in ethics was a sham, an artifice con-
cocted to disguise the reality that once moral theory is acted upon, all of the
human elements in the actors—whether agents or patients—are irretrievably part
of the situation. Impartiality thus becomes a disguise for other less noble motiva-
tions, for the view from 30,000 feet that leads us to consider all humans of equal
value does not survive for long on the ground. Humans are inevitably partial crea-
tures; only the artifice that results from denying the core of our humanity allows
us to pretend otherwise for a little while.
The individuals view of partiality Keller champions, however tentative and
incomplete his quest might seem by the end of the book, thus speaks to our fun-
damental experience of other people. Though it may be rooted in intuition, the
realization that another person matters “for her own sake” is ultimately experien-
tial—and, as Keller concludes, “it would take quite some argument to show that
the experience rests on an illusion” (156).
I hope Keller continues to work on what he calls “the phenomenology of par-
tiality”—however elusive it might be and however tentative his conclusions in
this particular book, he is onto something important.
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